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The strange and the familiar: seeing beyond when we know 
 
Abstract: 
My novel is a collection of interrelated stories. Each story is framed by the 
idiosyncrasies and prejudices of a different first-person voice. There are gaps in 
narrative time and there is disparity between the narrators’ voices. The result is a 
‘discontinuous narrative’; this term describes the early work of Frank Moorhouse: ‘an 
innovative narrative method using interconnected stories’ (Griffith University 2011).  
As I draft and re-draft the stories, I am forced to assess the interaction between the 
voices. I am aware of the disjuncture, and I ask myself: Why not tell the story through 
the eyes of one narrator? Why not choose a third-person perspective, an omniscient 
narrator who might collect all of the voices together, in a coherent way?   
As I second-guess my approach, I realise that the splintering of voices feels like the 
right way to tell the story and, in this way, I approach the question of methodology. I 
am aware that a sense of disjuncture arises out of the medley of voices, but I also 
realise that the disjuncture is carefully constructed; it is not accidental. This is an 
intuitive judgement.  
If I edit my novel ethically, I ask what the discontinuity achieves, rather than how it 
fails in the context of logic. This means that I recognise that the narrative begins from 
a place that does not worry about logic, and I realise that second-guessing the surface 
content of the narrative, from a rational perspective, may be counterproductive.  
The conscious mind, fettered as it is with inhibitions, may fail to see that the logical 
track is not necessarily the most productive route. The conscious mind may not 
recognise that going off-track is the way forward and, perhaps, the only way that the 
story can become something other than what I, in my rational mind, believe that it 
should be.  
Ethical editing means that I am attentive to my intuitive response to the narrative; it 
means that I tolerate incongruous elements of the narrative, even if they do not fit the 
criteria of logic.  
Ethical editing is a meeting of minds (both mine); the fully conscious mind meets the 
work of the subconscious mind with surprise and approval, at best, skepticism and 
derision, at worst. The work of the subconscious mind is elusive but it need not be 
subjugated to logical, rational considerations, for this means that I delimit the work of 
the subconscious; it means I assess the discontinuity on the basis of an external 
operating system; it means that I impose certain criteria upon the surface narrative, 
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criteria that has nothing to do with understanding why the discontinuity exists in the 
first instance.  
Alternatively, when I pay heed to a primal moment of narrative composition, a 
moment that is not necessarily consciously determined or logical, I apprise the 
surface of the narrative as a metaphorical map, I attempt to engage with the 
possibilities for meaning that the map encompasses; this constitutes a quest for the 
unstable how of meaning attribution.  
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Julia Prendergast is a PhD candidate in the School of Communication and Creative 
Arts at Deakin University, Melbourne. Her thesis consists of a novel and exegesis. 
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Introduction: discontinuity in my novel 
My novel (Prendergast 2012) is a collection of interrelated stories. Each story is 
framed by the idiosyncrasies and prejudices of a different first-person voice. There are 
gaps in narrative time and there is disparity between the narrators’ voices. The result 
is a ‘discontinuous narrative’; this term describes the early work of Frank Moorhouse: 
‘an innovative narrative method using interconnected stories’ (Griffith University 
2011).  
As I draft and re-draft the stories, I am forced to assess the interaction between the 
voices. I am aware of the disjuncture, and I ask myself: Why not tell the story through 
the eyes of one narrator? Why not choose a third-person perspective, an omniscient 
narrator who might collect all of the voices together, in a coherent way?   
As I second-guess my approach, I realise that the splintering of voices feels like the 
right way to tell the story and, in this way, I approach the question of methodology. I 
am aware that a sense of disjuncture arises out of the medley of voices, but I also 
realise that the disjuncture is carefully constructed; it is not accidental. This is an 
intuitive judgement.  
If I edit my novel ethically, I ask what the discontinuity achieves, rather than how it 
fails in the context of logic. This means that I recognise that the narrative begins from 
a place that does not worry about logic, and I realise that second-guessing the surface 
content of the narrative, from a rational perspective, may be counterproductive. 
Ethical editing means that I am attentive to my intuitive response to the narrative; it 
means that I tolerate the discontinuous structure, even if it does not fit the criteria of 
logic. 
Gertrude Stein says:  
let [the writing] take you and if it seems to take you off the track, don’t hold back, 
because that is perhaps instinctively where you want to be and if you hold back and 
try to be always where you have been before, you will go dry (Preston 1955: 160). 
What I refer to as intuition, Stein calls instinct. The point, in both instances, is that the 
conscious mind, fettered as it is with inhibitions, may fail to see that the logical track 
is not necessarily the most productive route. The conscious mind may not recognise 
that going off-track is the way forward and, perhaps, the only way that the story can 
become something other than what I, in my rational mind, believe that it should be.  
Editing my discontinuous narrative is a meeting of minds (both mine); the fully 
conscious mind meets the work of the subconscious mind with surprise and approval, 
at best, skepticism and derision, at worst. The work of the subconscious mind is 
elusive but it need not be subjugated to logical, rational considerations, for this means 
that I assess the discontinuity on the basis of an external operating system; this means 
that I impose certain criteria upon the surface narrative, criteria that has nothing to do 
with understanding why the discontinuity exists in the first instance.  
Ultimately, subjugating the work of the subconscious to external, rational 
considerations means that I delimit this work. Alternatively, when I pay heed to a 
primal moment of narrative composition, a moment that is not necessarily consciously 
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determined or logical, I am able to tolerate incongruous elements of the narrative, like 
discontinuity. Ethical editing means that I choose not to impose rational, logical 
strictures upon the narrative without question.  
My novel is a daughter’s quest for the memory-stories that her mother (Annie) is 
incapable of telling. At the beginning of the novel, Annie is withdrawn and 
dysfunctional; she relies on pills and alcohol to numb her existence; she barely gets 
out of bed for days at a time.  
I would like to begin with an extract from one of the stories in my novel. This story is 
an example of the peripheral stories in the narrative; it is an example of the stories that 
seem to wander aimlessly away from the novel’s central inquiry: why is Annie 
withdrawn and dysfunctional, what happened to her? I wonder why these peripheral 
stories are part of the narrative; I wonder how they contribute to the narrative as a 
whole. 
The narrators of these stories are minor players, characters on the fringe of the central 
inquiry about Annie’s demise. I struggle with these stories because they represent a 
diversion, and I am already grappling with a text that is riddled with diversions and 
potholes.  
The story ‘Getting away with murder’ is narrated from the perspective of Peter. Peter 
worked at the morgue when Annie’s son was brought there. Peter remembers Annie, 
talking about her at the beginning and the end of his story. He says: 
I didn’t trust that mother as far as I could throw her. She was hiding something. Who 
takes their dead boy away in a bag? That’s what I wanted to know. 
[And later]  
I hid in the Ti tree all night long, watching the mother and the boy in the dead bag.  
[…] I stepped out in the shadowy light of dawn, in my tinted glasses and my khaki 
army-pants with the thermal over-jacket; that’s when the mother knew that I had been 
there for the whole night, for the long haul, watching […] 
I am not blind, I said to her, and then I ran towards her, stopping a few steps short of 
the grave, taking my glasses off and yelling: You think you can get away with murder. 
NOT ON MY WATCH (Prendergast 2012). 
Despite these brief references to Annie, the story is about Peter. I struggle with this 
story because the overarching narrative is about Annie; the novel is propelled by a 
daughter’s quest for Annie’s memory-stories, and I ask myself: what has Peter’s story 
got to do with Annie? 
As I ask myself how this story relates to the overarching narrative, as I investigate 
how it contributes to the narrative as a whole, I interrogate the surface content of the 
story. I ask myself what the story is; I ask myself what the story does. The story asks: 
why does Peter see what he sees? How does he know what he knows? I realise that 
this ontological and epistemological inquiry underlies all of the first-person voices in 
the text; I realise that this inquiry connects the stories and that, in each instance, this 
inquiry is postulated in the context of the narrator’s remembering.  
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Discontinuity and remembering: structure and content 
The narrators of the stories are called on to remember Annie, and their remembering 
is riddled with idiosyncratic truth. In each instance, the narrator’s memory is a 
perception about self and present, in the context of yesterday and tomorrow. The 
narrative thereby plays out Daniel Schacter’s (1996: 308) observations about memory: 
‘[o]ur memories are the fragile but powerful products of what we recall from the past, 
believe about the present, and imagine about the future’. And so, when I ask myself: 
what do these peripheral stories have to do with Annie’s demise, I realise that the 
answer is: everything. Annie has withdrawn from society; she is completely 
dysfunctional; she is so plagued by her past that she cannot live in the present or 
envisage any sense of future. 
When we remember, meaning is produced as the result of successive additions. Proust 
suggests that: ‘remembering emerges from the comparison of two images: one in the 
present and one in the past’ (Schacter 1996: 28). In the stories, we see the interaction 
between the cue for remembering and the remembered material. This is an example of 
Schacter’s (1996: 70) proposal that: ‘a retrieval cue combines with the engram 
[memory trace] in order to yield a subjective experience that we call a memory’. The 
memory is, therefore, more than the replica of an original event, it is a story about an 
original event and this story relies, as Proust suggests, upon the interaction between 
past, present and future in the mind of the rememberer. I realise that the narrators of 
these peripheral stories are able to do what Annie cannot do and, that is, combine a 
perceived sense of self with a remembered image, thereby creating a memory-story.  
When I assess the multiple voices in my novel, I revisit Bhaktin’s notion of 
‘heteroglossia’; translated from ‘speech types [raznorecie]’, Bakhtin suggests that the 
languages of heteroglossia ‘live a real life’ and represent ‘the refracted (indirect) 
expression of [the author’s] intentions and values’ (Bakhtin 1934-5: 674, 674, 676, 
676). In this way, Bakhtin argues that intentions are the determining factor in the 
artistic organisation of the novel. 
As I edit my discontinuous narrative, the stories strike me as both strange and 
familiar. As I try to account for the elusive elements in the narrative, I become 
crucially aware that Bakhtin does not attend to the possibility that authorial intentions 
may not be fully consciously determined. On the contrary, I move towards an 
assessment of the operation of my subconscious, and an awareness of the shared 
ground between the stories, when I ask myself how the stories are connected. This 
means that I think about the narrative in terms of Freud’s ‘interweaving of […] 
reciprocal relations’ between ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ content (Freud 1900: 404, 400, 
400).  
When I think about Freud’s (1900: 400) appraisal of a dream (narrative) as ‘a picture 
puzzle, a rebus’, I am able to articulate a methodology that includes the operation of 
subconscious authorial intentions. I realise that elements of my discontinuous 
narrative are strange to me because I am estranged from them, and I am estranged 
from them because they are not consciously determined or logical, but at the same 
time they are familiar, strangely familiar, because they come from one and the same 
mind. 
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If the process of narrative composition were fully consciously determined and logical, 
it would be altogether familiar to me, and yet the opposite is true in the context of my 
discontinuous narrative, especially in the case of these peripheral stories, my 
experience is that they are quite strange. I have to work out what to make of these 
stories and it is surreal, like waking from a dream, and yet I become conversant with 
the surreal, and the strange becomes familiar, when I recognise that the picture puzzle 
is strung together by a common ontological and epistemological inquiry, the why and 
the how of idiosyncratic truth, in the context of memory. 
Seeing beyond when we know 
Hemingway describes the connection between the manifest and the latent content in 
narrative, the sense in which the former is ghosted by the latter. He claims that the 
subject matter of the story is-what-it-is:  
The sea is the sea. The old man is the old man. The boy is a boy and the fish is a fish. 
The sharks are all sharks no better and no worse. All the symbolism that people say is 
shit. What goes beyond is what you see beyond when you know (Baker 1981: 780). 
The notion of seeing beyond when you know is the work of the imaginative 
subconscious and Hemingway cuts to the core of my fascination with the nature of 
authorial intention.  
In the primal moment of narrative composition, seeing and logical-knowing separate. 
In this moment seeing and knowing are alogical. This is because narrative 
representation is a process of seeing beyond, outside the constraints of logic. This is 
what David Whish-Wilson (2009: 85) means when he speaks of ‘the “splitting” of 
normal consciousness whilst in the creative state’. When the mind is split, voice is 
pluralised, and I propose that this aspect is attributable to the work of the imagination 
in creative texts. I argue that conscious intention does not necessarily exist at the point 
of inception, so that the discontinuous structure of my narrative is intended, but not 
consciously so; it is intended beyond when I know, doubly intended when it is 
endorsed at the conscious, manifest level. 
In this way the operation of my subconscious ghosts the surface of the text. This is 
Derrida’s concept of ‘alterity’ operating within the realm of narrative; alterity is the 
‘trace’ of ‘otherness’ as it corresponds to presence, and discontinuous narrative 
foregrounds the shadowing effect of alterity (Rivkin & Ryan 2004: 278). This ghostly 
playoff between otherwise empty signs highlights the sense in which signs are an 
absent presence in the narrative. It is because signs are otherwise empty that a latent 
rhythm gives the surface its shape. 
I account for hybridity in the context of the push and pull of the strange and the 
familiar, the subconscious and the conscious mind, as opposed to Bakhtin, who 
accounts for hybridity in the context of ‘intertextual[ity]’; I account for heteroglossia 
in the realm of seeing beyond knowing, in the context of the work of the 
subconscious, as opposed to Bakhtin, who accounts for ‘heteroglossia’ in the context 
of conscious authorial ‘intention’ (Rivkin & Ryan 2004: 674, Bakhtin 1934-5: 676). 
My analysis differs from Bakhtin’s because it allows for the possibility that authorial 
intentions are not fully, consciously determined.   
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As I edit the manifest content of the narrative I compare the stories and, in doing so, I 
recognise similarity in difference or, as Aristotle says (defining metaphor): ‘the 
similarity […] in dissimilars’ (Ricoeur 1977: 23). Through the editing process, I 
realise that there are underlying similarities between the stories although, on the 
surface, they are quite different. Aristotle’s definition is particularly useful because I 
realise that the stories are connected metaphorically, through latent content. 
Comparing the stories in this way is a process of equating the ‘equal with the 
unequal’; Nietzsche suggests that: 
every idea originates by equating the equal with the unequal […] every word 
becomes at once an idea not by having  […] to serve as a reminder for the original 
experience […] but by having simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or less similar 
(which really means never equal, therefore altogether unequal) cases (Nietzsche 
1873: 263). 
Aristotle’s theory of the dissimilar-similar and Nietzsche’s theory of the unequal-
equal intersect; they explain how I can reason, in a rational, conscious way, about the 
work of the subconscious in narrative; they explain how latent content ghosts the 
surface of the narrative; they explain how latent and manifest content are strangely 
diametrically opposed, and yet familiar and compatible, and they do all of these 
things, because they explicate the operation of metaphor in the context of alterity.  
Susan Sontag suggests that, for Freud:  
manifest content must be probed and pushed aside to find the true meaning – the 
latent content – beneath [she says that] to interpret is to restate the phenomenon, in 
effect to find an equivalent for it (Sontag 1972: 655).  
As I edit my discontinuous narrative, the surface content is the starting point of 
inquiry. I am not suggesting that we read back and dismantle the sign; I agree with 
Hemingway: the sign is-what-it-is (albeit an otherwise empty is). I also believe that 
the spirit of Hemingway’s definition is in keeping with Sontag’s notion of 
‘transparence’; when Hemingway speaks of the is-what-it-is of the sign, he is 
referring to what Sontag calls ‘the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being 
what they are’ (Sontag 1972: 659).  
We can see through that which is luminous and transparent, and it is this condition of 
being see-through that is consistent with the otherwise empty sign. The sign is empty 
but for ‘the trace of other things’; Derrida proposes that to bear the trace of other 
things is to be ‘constituted as a fabric of differences’, thereby giving ‘presence’ to the 
is-what-it-is of the sign (Rivkin & Ryan 2004: 278, Derrida 1968: 286). Trace 
explains how presence is simulated; trace explains how the otherwise empty sign 
becomes full.  
In the context of trace, and in response to Sontag, I propose that there are no 
equivalents for manifest content; there are only unequal equals, dissimilar similars; 
this is so because the manifest content is a metaphorical map, a surface rebus of 
otherwise empty signs. Latent content is not a means to dismantling the is-what-it-is 
of the sign, because latent content is itself an interpretation. Sontag (1972: 654) 
suggests that interpretation has merit ‘only in the broadest sense, the sense in which 
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Nietzsche (rightly) says, [“]There are no facts, only interpretations[”] ’. Latent content 
is an interpretation, rather than a fact, because latent content is not prescriptive; it 
attaches itself to the surface content in a non-prescriptive way, as shadow, as trace.  
The relationship between latent and manifest content takes an interest in the way that 
signs become full. In this way, my methodology fits Sontag’s (1972: 660) description 
of the ‘function of criticism’: a process that ‘should […] show how [the narrative] is 
what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means’. My appraisal 
of the surface of the narrative, as a metaphorical map, is not an attempt to make it 
mean, but an attempt to engage with the possibilities for meaning that the map 
encompasses; this constitutes a quest for the unstable how of a meaning attribution. 
Conclusion – ethics and editing: assigning value  
The concepts of alterity, the dissimilar, and the unequal, underlie J. Hillis Miller’s 
theory of displacement; Hillis Miller (1992: 235) claims that narrative meaning 
arrives out of ‘displacement from one sign to another sign that in its turn draws its 
meaning from another figurative sign’. In this way, Hillis Miller explains how latent 
content is an absent-presence in the text; he explains how the relationship between 
latent and manifest content is metaphorical. It is this metaphorical manoeuvre that 
renders strangeness, strangely familiar. This manoeuvre configures content as absent 
presence. It is within this context, of absent presence, that I understand Sudesh 
Mishra’s (2006: 110) discussion of ‘aporetic manoeuvre[s]’ in language: the ‘extreme 
reorientation of consciousness that permits language to stand in a radical relationship 
to itself’. This manoeuvre is the means by which I familiarise myself with the strange, 
in the context of the dissimilar-similar, unequal-equal, of latent content. 
In ‘The Uncanny’, Freud (1919: 420) refers to this reorientation of consciousness; he 
speaks of ‘shades of meaning’, an intriguing anomaly whereby one thing is pushed to 
the point that it becomes ‘identical with its opposite’. As shades of meaning intersect, 
contradiction merges into compatibility; one thing becomes the other because shades 
of meaning ghost the sign, intersecting at every turn, investing and reinvesting the 
sign with meaning. This occurs in a neverending chain of inversion and 
supplementation, allowing the strange to become, strangely familiar.  
And so I might agree with Hemingway, that the manifest content of the narrative is a 
world of boys and fish and sharks, or, in the case of my narrative, a world of 
discontinuity, diversion and ‘Getting away with murder’; these things are what they 
are, no more, no less, tangible, hard-core, manifest content, but this content is 
otherwise empty; this content has presence precisely because we see beyond when we 
know, because this content is informed by the reverberations that simulate presence.  
When we encounter a story without knowing what in the world it could possibly 
mean, it is like waking from a dream. In the world of dreams, like narrative, what we 
see is determined beyond the point of knowing, because in this context seeing is not 
constrained by logic. 
As I edit the text as a hybrid construction, I negotiate between manifest and latent 
narrative content. This is an ethical negotiation because I assign value to elements of 
the representation as I rewrite and rearrange the narrative material. I recognise that the 
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manifest content of the stories is a patchwork of signs, a picture puzzle of dissimilar-
similars, unequal-equals. The stories are not necessarily coherent; they may be elusive 
and ambiguous. I have to work out what to make of the stories, and working out what 
to make of them does not mean that I reconstruct the narrative in order to make it 
coherent, or that I rewrite the narrative to fit the criteria of logic.  
Discontinuous narrative is a representation that foregrounds heteroglossia in the 
context of the absent presence of the unstable sign. As I grapple with the strange and 
the familiar, in the context of my discontinuous narrative, I attend to the possibility 
that narrative representation is not fully, consciously intended; I realise that my role, 
as editor of my narrative, is an ethical negotiation; I accept that my discontinuous 
narrative is multiple-voiced, not only literally, in the context of multiple first person 
narrators, but metaphorically multiple-voiced, in the context of the unequal-equal, 
dissimilar-similar, of latent content. 
I am aware that my ethical engagement with my writing is a process of negotiating 
between the somewhat-strange workings of the subconscious, and the more familiar 
workings of logic. When I am attentive to latent narrative content, as trace, I have 
faith in a vision that I intend beyond when I know. 
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